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Abstract: While aggressively embracing free trade agreements (FTAs) in general,
East Asian countries have incorporated security and political factors in promoting
FTAs under the swiftly shifting regional economic and security environments,
epitomized by the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the inten-
sifying Sino-Japanese rivalry. Therefore, a sole focus on economic factors
would fail to shed light on East Asian strategies for linking FTAs and security.
While FTAs have mushroomed in East Asia since 2000, East Asian countries
have pursued FTAs not merely to increase their economic interests. In many
cases, they have attempted to link FTAs to broader security considerations.
However, they have demonstrated markedly diverse ways of linking FTAs and
security, depending on their primary economic and security imperatives as well
as their domestic political situations.
Keywords: economic-security nexus, FTA, linkage strategy, Korea, China, Japan,
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INTRODUCTION
Economic interdependence among East Asian countries has substantially increased
since the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, East Asian countries pursued informal networking
in the region until the late 1990s, rather than seeking formal integration (Hemmer &
Katzenstein, 2002). However, since 2000 East Asian countries have demonstrated
greater interest in institutionalizing the region as they actively undertook free trade
agreement (FTA) negotiations. Major countries in East Asia have engaged in multiple
FTA deals over the last decade. Despite its belated jump onto the FTA bandwagon,
Manuscript received February 10, 2012; out for review February 21, 2012; review completed March
15, 2012; accepted March 29, 2012.
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2012), pp. 109-129.
© 2012 by the GSPA, Seoul National University
** This work was supported by a National Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean
government (NRF-2010-330-B00027).
** Seungjoo Lee is a professor of Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Chung-Ang University. E-mail: seungjoo@cau.ac.kr
China quickly completed nine FTAs, with another five deals under negotiation
(MOFCOM, 2012). Departing from its longstanding emphasis on informal networks
in the region, Japan has also finalized 12 FTAs and is currently negotiating four more
(MOFA, 2012). South Korea has completed eight FTA deals with 45 countries, includ-
ing the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
with seven FTAs under negotiation (MOFAT, 2011). Singapore, most enthusiastic
about FTAs in East Asia, has concluded 20 FTAs, of which 18 are in effect and two
are signed (Government of Singapore, 2010). This change is largely seen as an attempt
to transform deepened economic integration into more institutionalized arrangements
(Aggarwal & Koo, 2007; Pempel, 2006).
What motivated East Asian countries to make such a dramatic turnaround? A sole
focus on economic factors would fail to shed light on East Asia’s greater appetite for
FTAs. East Asian countries have incorporated security and political factors in promoting
FTAs. Swift shifts in regional economic and security environments that are epitomized
by the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the intensifying Sino-Japanese
rivalry are the considerations that East Asian countries took into account in seeking
FTAs. With this backdrop, the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia is a good example of
the way in which an economic-security nexus is forged (Pempel, 2010).
Rivalry between China and Japan shows the way in which security concerns
profoundly affect both countries’ FTA strategies. The dual dynamics of competition
and cooperation are incorporated into both countries’ FTA strategies. On the one hand,
neither country attempted to impede the other’s vital interests. Japan has avoided sign-
ing an FTA with Taiwan despite urgent calls from the Taiwanese side, assuming that
doing so would offend Beijing. On the other hand, both countries’ aspirations for
regional leadership hampered the formation of a China-Japan FTA, despite enormous
economic benefits. The rivalry also militates against the formation of an East Asian
FTA that could unite countries in the region in one unified free trade area. Instead,
China and Japan competed to court Southeast Asian countries as FTA partners. That
is, both countries’ strategic considerations, combined with collective memory of the
historical past, clashes of national identity, and the eruption of territorial disputes,
significantly hinder efforts to form a China-Japan FTA as well as an East Asian FTA
(Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003; Katzenstein, 1997; Pempel, 2005).
The dynamic evolution of an economic-security nexus has substantially altered
regional institutional dynamics. In this regard, the economic-security linkage reflected
in an FTA may serve as a double-edged sword in institutionalizing East Asia coopera-
tion. Whereas institutionalized cooperation spurred by FTAs is expected to substantially
allay security concerns in East Asia, political and security considerations are likely to
hinder the formation of a region-wide FTA in East Asia.
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This paper explains divergent patterns of economic-security nexus by exploring
East Asian countries’ FTA strategies. It addresses the following issues: How did external
factors, such as the collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia and the Asian
financial crisis of 1997, affect East Asian countries’ strategies of linkage between FTA
and security alliance? What security factors are responsible for shaping the linkage
strategy? And how does the interplay of external and domestic factors influence the
evolution of East Asian countries’ linkage strategy?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a
brief overview of the existing literature on the security effects of FTAs. Subsequent
sections explore how East Asian countries—China, Japan, Singapore, and South
Korea—have implemented different strategies for linking economic and security
matters in promoting FTAs. The conclusion draws some theoretical and practical
implications arising from the main findings of the paper.
ECONOMIC-SECURITY NEXUS IN EAST ASIA
A vast literature exists of attempts to explain crucial features of East Asian
countries’ FTAs such as the economic, political, and security determinants of FTA
policy (Aggarwal, 2006; Katada & Solis, 2007). While it is generally argued that an
economic “domino effect” spurred countries to rush to FTAs to evade negative economic
impacts (see Baldwin, 1993), it is also worth examining the way in which government
policy makers also take traditional security and strategic considerations into account in
negotiating FTAs (Feinberg, 2003; Ravenhill, 2008). For example, great powers may
sign FTAs to reward military allies and strengthen their security status. In this view,
countries are more likely to form FTA networks with allies rather than selecting FTA
partners purely on the basis of economic benefits. The US government is explicit in
linking foreign economic and security policy, as demonstrated by the US-Israel and
US-Jordan FTAs. The “securitization” of FTA policy has further accelerated in the
post-9/11 era (Higgott, 2004). In East Asia, the US-Singapore FTA was the first
obviously securitized FTA. From the US perspective, it was a reward for Singapore’s
provision of military facilities.
Building on the prior literature, this paper explores how East Asian countries
incorporate security and strategic factors into FTA policy-making. The common traits
shared by East Asian countries—such as a tendency to sign FTAs with minor economic
partners, the limited coverage of FTAs, and weak evidence of an active business
lobby—are indicative that the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia is driven not just by
economic interests but also by political and strategic domino effects (Ravenhill, 2010).
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The paper also sheds light on how and why great and small powers pursue
immensely different linkage strategies. In terms of trade share covered by FTAs, East
Asian countries show quite different patterns. Countries such as Indonesia (66.3
percent), Singapore (65.9 percent), Thailand (55 percent), and Viet Nam (53.7 percent)
have a higher share than the world average. By contrast, the ratio is considerably
lower than the world average in major countries such as China (19.2 percent), Japan
(16.5 percent), and Korea (14.8 percent). If FTAs recently signed are included, the
ratio for China and Japan changes slightly to 19.4 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively.
The ratio for South Korea rises to 35.1 percent if the Korea-EU FTA and Korea-US
(KORUS) FTAs are included. But even this ratio is lower than that of major countries
in other regions such as Germany (74.8 percent), France (76 percent), the United
Kingdom (63.9 percent), and the United States (37.7 percent) (Institute of International
Trade of Korea, 2011).
This difference between great powers and small countries stems from the different
patterns of linkages between economy and security. Whereas China and Japan did not
sign bilateral or trilateral FTAs in fear of their negative security externalities, despite
the rapid growth of bilateral and trilateral trade for the last decade, small countries are
more active in attracting great powers to maximize economic gains as well as to
reduce their security vulnerabilities (on the security effects of FTAs, see Mochizuki,
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Figure 1.  Share of Trade Covered by FTAs
Note: Horizontal line indicates world average (49.2 percent).
Source: Institute of International Trade of Korea, 2011.
2009).
From a broader security perspective, great powers tend to seek FTAs as a means to
balance against the target state. China and Japan competed to attract regional countries
to their sides to (re)design the regional institutional architecture to exclude the other.
Both countries’ rush to sign an FTA with ASEAN vividly shows this dynamic.
Despite greater economic gains from a China-Japan FTA, strategic considerations—
the desire to take the initiative in regional institution building—pushed them to court
ASEAN competitively.
By contrast, small countries are inclined to sign FTAs with bigger partners for
diplomatic and security reasons. The fear of exclusion and security vulnerability
forces small countries to engage in FTA negotiations with great powers (Gruber,
2000). Small countries surrounded by regional powers prefer great powers outside
the region as their FTA partners. Small states that do not want regional institutions to
be dominated by one great power are also likely to pursue FTAs with other great
powers (Grieco, 1997). With this backdrop, small countries sometimes enter into FTA
negotiations with bigger countries although they may run the risk of having to make
more concessions.
CHINA: PREEMPTIVE AND STRATEGIC LINKAGE STRATEGY
Political and security considerations take a central importance in Chinese FTA
policy-making. Some analysts argue that security motivation in FTAs looms even
greater in China than in the United States (deLisle, 2006). Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)’s political dominance and centralized policy-making structure, led by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), greatly helped China carry out its linkage strategy
in a coherent way, compared to other East Asian countries that often faced political
gridlock in garnering domestic support on FTA policy (Kwei, 2006). It is against this
backdrop that China could utilize FTAs as an instrument to achieve foreign and security
policy goals.1 FTAs effectively served the Chinese government’s objectives not just to
expand its sphere of influence in the international arena, but also to launch its charm
offensive in East Asia (see Kurlanzick, 2008).
China’s FTA policy was undoubtedly influenced by Japan’s first move to sign an
FTA with Singapore. For China, Japan’s initial move was seen as an attempt to establish
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1. In addition, viewing securing access to natural resources as in its security interest, China
aggressively embarked on FTA negotiations with resource-abundant countries in the Middle
East and Africa.
regional leadership in East Asia by encircling China. The Chinese government strove
to derail the Japanese endeavor by embarking on FTA negotiations with its neighboring
countries (Yang & Heng, 2010). In addition, it was of paramount importance for China
to prevent Southeast Asian countries from aligning with the US efforts to contain
China (Wesley, 2008).
In economic terms, China made a great deal of effort to assure its neighboring
countries that although the current economic structures of China and ASEAN are
competitive, their economic interdependence can make them complementary in the
long run. The Chinese government further argued that the China-ASEAN FTA will
facilitate deep economic integration, while enhancing diplomatic and political ties as
well.
China executed strategic and preemptive linkages in the course of the negotiations
to accommodate Southeast Asian countries’ interests. First, China has made tremendous
efforts to assure Southeast Asian countries that its rise would remain peaceful and
would not conflict with their interests. To allay Southeast Asian countries’ security
concerns, in 2002, China signed the ASEAN Code of Conduct on Disputes in the
South China Sea as a token of its willingness to settle territorial disputes peacefully.
With the signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Southeast Asia in 2003,
China accelerated its charm offensive to signal that it would abide by long-standing
dispute settlement practices firmly established by Southeast Asian countries (Zhao,
2010). China’s efforts succeeded, at least to some degree, in ameliorating Southeast
Asian countries’ worries about a China threat. The Joint Declaration on Strategic
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, signed by China and ASEAN, illustrated this and
stated that the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation “demonstrated that the
political trust between the two sides notably enhanced” (ASEAN, 2009).
Second, China aptly took advantage of its developing country status at the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), as the WTO stipulates that developing countries can sign
an FTA based on the enabling clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Under these more lenient rules, China was not required to liberalize “substan-
tially all trade” and could exclude sensitive sectors, such as banking and telecommuni-
cations, from liberalization. The developing country status put China in a better position
to accommodate Southeast Asian countries’ interests, compared to Japan, which had
to abide by the stricter GATT Article XXIV to sign FTAs (Solis, 2009).
The Early Harvest Program was another centerpiece of Chinese linkage strategy.
The Chinese government offered early liberalization of agricultural imports from
Southeast Asian countries to accelerate the implementation of the China-ASEAN
FTA. It was designed to reduce Southeast Asian countries’ concern about negative
consequences of the China-ASEAN FTA. The provisions of the Early Harvest Program
114 The Emergence of an Economic-Security Nexus
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
were immediately included in the Framework Agreement, although it was expected
that farmers in southern provinces would suffer. Commenced in January 2004, the
program put 562 agricultural items on the list of early liberalization (ASEAN, 2010).
As shown in table 1, tariffs on items under the EHP were to be eliminated within two
years.
It is against this backdrop that China proposed the China-ASEAN FTA at the
ASEAN-China Summit in 2000 under Premier Zhu Rongji’s initiative. By proposing
the China-ASEAN FTA, the Chinese government aimed to ameliorate Southeast
Asian countries’ concerns about the potential impact of China’s WTO accession on
their economies. In negotiating the FTA with ASEAN, China’s political leadership
prioritized overall strategic and security interests over narrow economic interests.
China’s centralized FTA policy-making made preemptive and strategic moves possible.
Under the guidance of the CCP, the MOFA as a lead agency in FTA policy-making
successfully minimized potential conflicts among government ministries. This
institutional feature allowed China to make unilateral concessions to Southeast Asian
countries, despite the Ministry of Agriculture’s concern about economic loss in the
agricultural sector.2 The Chinese made a preemptive move to conclude an FTA with
ASEAN as a whole, assuming that such a move would put China in a better position to
compete with Japan and exclude the United States from regional leadership (Cai,
2004). China’s linkage strategy is in stark contrast to Japan’s FTA strategy, which
simultaneously pursued multiple FTAs with individual Southeast Asian countries.
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Table 1.  Early Harvest Program in China-ASEAN FTA
Product category Not later than January Not later than January Not later than January 2004 2005 2006
MFN tariff rates 
higher than 15% 10% 5% 0%
MFN tariff rates 
between 5% and 15% 5% 0% 0%
MFN tariff rates lower 
than 5% 0% 0% 0%
Note: MFN refers to most favored nation.
Source: ASEAN, 2010.
2. Jiang (2010) argues that China’s FTA policy-making has become less strategic and coherent.
Since the Ministry of Commerce, with expertise in trade negotiations, took over the MOFA’s
position as lead agency, economic considerations have become more important.
JAPAN: REACTIVE LINKAGE STRATEGY
Japan’s FTA policy also has security and strategic drivers. However, Japan’s linkage
strategy is essentially reactive because the Japanese government is domestically
constrained in linking economy and security. Although its political power has declined,
the iron triangle formed by farmers, zoku politicians with keen interests in protecting
the agricultural sector in the LPD, and the Ministry of Agriculture still was able to
put mounting pressure on the Japanese government. Furthermore, unable to dispel
neighboring countries’ suspicion of its strategic intentions, which were rooted in
historical memories, Japan was restrained in taking a leadership role in East Asia.
Despite this political and institutional gridlock, the Japanese government suddenly
departed from its traditional policy stance to pursue FTAs. China was a core reason for
this change. In the 1990s, experts and commentators argued that Japan was content to
wield “network power” stemming from its widespread production networks in East
Asia and did not seek leadership in formally institutionalizing relations in the region.
However, after 2000, the rise of China profoundly changed Japan’s strategic calculus.
Since its accession to the WTO, China’s economic engagement with Southeast Asian
countries has steadily increased. In addition, the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia as
well as China’s aggressive FTA policy encouraged Japan to rethink its traditional
policy.
However, in contrast to China’s proactive and coherent linkage strategy, Japan’s
linkage strategy is inherently reactive and defensive (Sally, 2006). Japan’s decision to
embark on FTA negotiations with ASEAN is a good case in point. The Japanese
government’s institutional arrangements, coalitions among key players, and pattern of
interaction combined to shape the reactive nature of Japanese FTA policy. The pattern
of political coalition has become complicated as voters became ambivalent in identify-
ing and articulating their interests and preferences about trade. The interests of the
agricultural sector, which had inspired staunch anti-liberalization movements, diverged
between traditional protectionists and internationalists. The interests of the manufac-
turing industry were not monolithic, either, as they were divided between highly com-
petitive multinational corporations and small and medium-size enterprises (Krauss &
Naoi, 2010).
Within the government, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)
succeeded in playing a pivotal role in launching the FTA drive only after it overcame
the skepticism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which perceived METI’s initiative
with respect to FTAs as encroaching on its own mandate. However, the diversified
FTA policy-making structure and strong agricultural opposition inherently limited the
Japanese government’s ability to design a coherent linkage strategy. The four-ministry
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system in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), METI, Ministry of Finance
(MOF), and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MOAFF) are involved in
FTA policy-making requires time-consuming consultations and discussions among
them, because each ministry has a veto.3 This system of FTA policy-making was a
source of gridlock that prevented the Japanese government from taking a proactive
posture in promoting FTAs.
Given this situation, Japan chose Singapore as its first FTA partner mainly because
agriculture would be excluded from this FTA (Terada, 2009). Since then, Japan has
proceeded with FTA negotiations with individual Southeast Asian countries. In the
face of mounting pressure from the agricultural sector, the Japanese government
thought that this strategy would serve Japan’s interests better, because the Japanese
government would be able to take advantage of its asymmetric power in dealing with
individual Southeast Asian countries (Lee, 2009).
Alarmed by China’s preemptive move, however, Japan was under pressure to court
Southeast Asian countries and compete for regional leadership. Nonetheless, Japan’s
negotiations with ASEAN were riddled with conflicts and delays. Although Japan and
ASEAN agreed in November 2002 to launch negotiations, and started preliminary
talks in 2004, formal negotiations did not start until April 2005, because the two parties
could not agree on the coverage and the schedule for tariff reductions or removals.
The sluggish progress of the FTA negotiations, hampered by bureaucratic rivalry,
ultimately led to Prime Minister Koizumi’s intervention in FTA policy-making. The
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy was a political arm of the Koizumi government
in its drive to firmly establish political control over bureaucrats. In FTA policy-making,
in December 2003, the Koizumi government created the Council on Ministers Con-
cerned with the Promotion of Economic Partnership to remedy the institutional barriers
by increasing political control over the ministries (Lee, 2009).
Under the new policy-making structure, the Japanese government could seek
regional leadership more effectively. Jolted by the China-ASEAN FTA, the Koizumi
government modified its FTA strategy (Yoshimatsu, 2006). Japan initially preferred
FTAs with individual ASEAN countries, and concluded agreements with seven coun-
tries by 2009.4 However, alarmed by the China-ASEAN FTA, Japan modified this
strategy in 2008 to sign an FTA with ASEAN, demonstrating that Japan’s FTAs are
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3. It is well documented that Japan’s policy-making is saddled with bureaucratic infighting as
well as strong political pressure from the agricultural sector (Mulgan, 2005).
4. Terada (2011). Seven ASEAN members that currently implement an individual FTA with
Japan are Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. http://www
.fta.gov.sg/fta_ajcep.asp?hl=38.
not purely driven by economic factors but reflect its desire to rejuvenate its presence
in the region.5 Diplomatic and security concerns led the Koizumi government to
overcome domestic constraints to start a Japan-ASEAN FTA.
Japan also tried to engage with extra-regional powers. In particular, the Japan-
Australia FTA was an outgrowth of Japan’s strategic and security concerns. Strength-
ening economic ties between China and Australia clearly prompted Japan to embark
on FTA negotiations with Australia. Otherwise, it was inconceivable to launch FTA
negotiations with Australia, which accounts for about 10 percent of Japan’s total
agricultural imports, because the Japanese government still faced staunch agricultural
protectionism in the domestic political arena. Departing from its reactive policy, which
was heavily influenced by protectionist interests, the Japanese government decided to
embark on FTA deals with a major exporter of agricultural products (Capling, 2008).
The economic-security nexus became even more obvious when, in addition to the
opening of the FTA negotiations, both governments announced their intention to sign
a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The Japanese move was
somewhat unexpected because Japan had not formed a formal security partnership
with any countries other than the United States (Solis, 2009). Negotiations for a Japan-
Australia FTA were made possible, because political security considerations spear-
headed by Koizumi’s leadership substantially weakened domestic constraints.
SINGAPORE: LINKAGE WITH REGIONAL 
AND EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS
Singapore is most explicit in implementing a linkage strategy. Singapore is not
highly motivated to push for FTAs because, with near zero tariffs, it expects limited
economic gains from trade liberalization. Singapore’s shift toward bilateral FTAs
could be seen as its strategic response to heightened uncertainties such as the rise of
regional trading agreements and shifting security relations in East Asia. Security
considerations are thoroughly incorporated in the FTA strategy of Singapore, for
which survival has been the foremost preoccupation since independence and “has
been its credo in its foreign policy” (Leifer, 2000, p. 68). Singapore’s interest in FTAs
has grown not just out of economic interests but also from security considerations.
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5. Japan clearly had economic motivations for this change. Because Japanese firms operate
production networks in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government found it crucial to harmo-
nize rules of origin across Southeast Asian countries to manage intra-firm trade in the
region (METI, 2008).
Singapore has attempted to link security needs to economic interdependence, hoping
that an increase in economic interdependence with many countries, particularly with
multiple great powers, will substantially reduce its insecurity (Pang, 2007).
Singapore’s linkage strategy has unfolded in two ways. First, it has pursued bilateral
FTAs. While Southeast Asia’s overall economic vitality and political stability have
been vital to Singapore’s sustainable growth (Leifer, 2000), its policy stance toward
Southeast Asia underwent a subtle evolutionary change as it attempted to transform
itself into a regional hub in a wide range of industries, ranging from financial to
telecommunication and transport services (Weber, 2001).
Singapore seeks bilateral FTAs with countries outside the region to expand and
diversify its trading base. This necessity has dramatically increased since the Asian
financial crisis in 1997, in which Singapore was frustrated with the divisions within
ASEAN and with ASEAN’s inability to resolve the crisis. It took four months for
ASEAN to make the simple declaration that the countries in the region affected by the
crisis should develop their own means of tackling the crisis. This lack of leadership in
ASEAN was further aggravated by Indonesia’s subsequent economic and political
chaos (Business Times, January 15, 2001). Under this circumstance, the Singapore
government began to seek alternative sources of stability to alleviate its vulnerability
to regional turmoil.
Furthermore, surrounded by Malaysia and Indonesia, large Islamic countries that
occasionally aligned in an aggressive way to pose a security threat, Singapore tried to
court regional great powers as a way of reducing security vulnerability. In this regard,
China and Japan are natural candidates. Singapore concluded an FTA with Japan in
2002, the first FTA between East Asian countries, and pushed for an FTA with China,
which was signed in October 2008 after eight rounds of negotiation. Singapore con-
cluded FTAs with these two regional powers individually, despite the opposition of
neighboring countries, which argued that Singapore’s FTA with these great powers
would hurt ASEAN’s unity. The Singapore government thought that attracting the two
regional powers was an effective means of reducing its vulnerability.
Second, Singapore has also been active in forging ties with great powers outside
East Asia. The primary motivation for this has to do with the rise of China. Although
China has repeatedly stated that its peaceful rise would not be detrimental to the core
interests of Southeast Asian countries, Singapore was not certain about China’s
intentions in the region and chose to pursue ties with extra-regional great powers. As
shown in the remarks of Raymond Lim, Minister of State for Trade and Industry and
Foreign Affairs, Singapore has to attract bigger extra-regional powers to anchor their
presence in the region and ensure that they remain stakeholders in Southeast Asia
(Straits Times, March 3, 2003). It is against this backdrop that Singapore sought a US-
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Singapore FTA even if it had to concede in some key industries such as finance (Lee,
2006). With the commencement of the US-Singapore FTA, both countries agreed to
sign a strategic partnership agreement, suggesting that Singapore’s policy objective
was to link FTAs to security.
Both the US strategy in East Asia and Singapore’s FTA policy-making structure
helped the Singapore government implement the linkage strategy effectively. First,
Singapore’s goal was commensurate with the core interests of the United States.
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the key US policy objective was to derail any
power’s attempt at dominating the region to the exclusion of the United States (Shirk,
2010, p. 31). The United States has consistently attempted to establish a military pres-
ence and strengthen its bilateral alliances in the region (Green, 2010, p. 36). In short,
Singapore and the United States shared a common view that it is in their interests to
coordinate security policies in the rapidly changing security environment in Southeast
Asia (Terada, 2009).
Second, in the face of internal and external pressures for change, the Singapore
government has displayed its capacity to transform the economy as well (Low, 2001).
In the area of foreign economic policy, major players are the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade Development Board, Monetary Authority
of Singapore, and Ministry of Communications and Information. Academics from
renowned universities and research institutes, as well as business leaders, play a crucial
role in making policies related to FTAs in formal and informal ways. However, the
Singapore government has maintained a highly unified policy-making structure in which
jurisdictional authority is centralized within a single ministry. That is, although many
government agencies are involved in FTA negotiations, policy making in Singapore is
primarily led by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, minimizing the potential for a
bureaucratic turf war (Lee, 2006).
The Singapore government was essential in initiating and sustaining the FTA drive.
This policy-making structure to some extent mirrors the highly centralized nature of the
political leadership in Singapore that took the initiative in pushing for FTAs. However,
one should not exaggerate the dominance of the state. While insulated from societal
interests, the Singapore government managed to maintain a close relationship with the
private sector, which in turn helped the government establish a channel that could
facilitate information sharing between the government and the private sector. For
example, business leaders such as representatives from the Association of Banks in
Singapore and Neptune Orient Lines, as well as academics from the National University
of Singapore and Singapore Institute of International Affairs, played a pivotal role in
drawing up a feasibility report before the Ministry of Trade and Industry embarked on
formal negotiations with Japan. The same was true in the case of Singapore-Korea
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FTA negotiations. In this sense, the political leadership and bureaucracy in Singapore
often cooperate with business people and academics, blurring boundaries between
public and private (Hamilton-Hart, 2000).
SOUTH KOREA: SECURITIZATION OF THE FTA
Korea is a unique case in that it signed an FTA with a country with which it also
had a formal security alliance treaty. While the policy shift toward FTAs under President
Kim Dae-jung marked a dramatic departure from South Korea’s traditional trade policy,
it was not until President Roh entered office in 2003 that the road map and detailed
action plans for FTAs were drawn up (Lee, 2007, p. 116; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade of Korea, 2006). The Roh administration consolidated Kim’s FTA agenda
by outlining a comprehensive road map for South Korea’s multitrack FTAs. Under the
road map, South Korea’s FTA partners are classified into three broad groups: (1)
immediate FTA partners such as Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), and Japan; (2) medium-term FTA partners such as Mexico, Canada, ASEAN,
and China; and (3) long-term FTA partners such as the United States, the EU, and
India. The road map emphasized that FTAs were an important part of South Korea’s
goal to become an “open trading state” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of
Korea, 2006).
It was clear that in contrast to its rather peripheral status in President Kim’s 
economic and strategic agenda, the FTA policy emerged as a core element of President
Roh’s foreign economic policy vision, thereby departing from his initial vision for
Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Lee & Koo, 2006; Koo, 2009). A careful
examination of the Roh government’s FTA policy reveals two interesting anomalies.
One is the lack of policy efforts to expedite an FTA among China, Japan, and South
Korea, and the other is an unexpectedly early push for the KORUS FTA. One might
expect rapidly rising intraregional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in North-
east Asia to spur South Korea to prioritize institutionalized economic cooperation with
China and Japan. South Korea is likely to realize significant tangible and intangible
benefits from bilateral or trilateral FTAs among the three countries. Nonetheless, the
trilateral FTA has made very little progress, which is puzzling given these countries’
geographic proximity and economic interdependence.
The move toward a KORUS FTA is the most illustrative example of the Roh
administration’s top-down and proactive FTA strategy. The Roh government suddenly
revised the timetable for FTA negotiations and promulgated the FTA road map to
announce its intention to start FTA negotiations with the United States. As Northeast
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Asian regionalism stagnated, the Roh government surprised the Korean public on
February 3, 2006, by announcing that it would embark on FTA negotiations with the
United States, becoming the first Northeast Asian country to do so. Despite South
Korean filmmakers’ protests, the Roh government made a surprise move in February
2006 to cut South Korea’s annual screen quota limiting US film imports, removing the
last hurdle to the start of KORUS FTA negotiations.6 In addition to the screen quota
reduction, the Roh government also lifted the ban on US beef, proposed modifications
to the pharmaceutical pricing system, and revised an automobile remissions regulation
to provide a grace period for imported vehicles.
The pace of the negotiations reflected the Roh government’s sincere determination
to achieve the KORUS FTA. The two countries held two rounds of official talks in
summer 2006, targeting March 2007 as the intended date of conclusion despite criticism
of this unusually tight timetable. Beginning with the first negotiation on June 5, 2006,
the two countries completed eight rounds of negotiation within eight months. Finally,
on April 2, 2007, the governments of the two countries signed the KORUS FTA
(MOFAT FTA Homepage, http://www.fta.go.kr). All of these measures were intended
to show the South Korean government’s seriousness about and commitment to a
KORUS FTA (Cooper & Manyin, 2007).
South Korea’s entrance into the KORUS FTA negotiations signaled that the focus
of its FTA policy has profoundly changed—from a reactive and gradualist strategy to
minimize the negative effects of FTAs to a proactive and aggressive strategy aimed to
maximize their benefits. What accounts for the policy shift? The Roh government
pushed for the KORUS FTA, believing that it would serve both the economic and
security interests of South Korea. On the one hand, the KORUS FTA will substantially
increase South Korea’s economic gains from liberalization of trade and investment.
On the other hand, the KORUS FTA was the Roh government’s hedging strategy to
effectively cope with volatile strategic environments in the region by transforming a
security alliance into a comprehensive alliance with the United States (Sohn & Koo,
2011).
First, facing the failure of its strategies to make Korea East Asia’s economic hub,
the Roh government attempted to rejuvenate its vision by promoting the KORUS
FTA. The Roh government thought that the KORUS FTA would boost South Korea’s
economic as well as strategic position in East Asia. Korea’s deteriorating economic
position in East Asia prompted the Roh government to seek FTAs with major
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6. South Korea’s screen quota system was designed to stem a flood of Hollywood blockbusters.
South Korea cut the quota from 146 days or 40 percent reserved for domestic films to 73
days or 20 percent starting on July 1, 2006 (Chosun Ilbo, January 26, 2006).
economies outside the region. Since 2000, South Korea’s competitive advantage has
seriously weakened as the industrial structures of the three countries in Northeast Asia
have become more competitive. The Roh government worried that South Korea’s
economic position would further weaken if China or Japan concluded an FTA with the
United States ahead of Korea (Moon & Rhyu, 2010).
The Roh government believed that the KORUS FTA had the potential to alter the
dynamics of US-South Korean economic relations as well as the relations between the
United States, Japan, China, and South Korea.7 President Roh stated that “China is
surging. South Korea is trapped between China and Japan, and thus needs to address
this undesirable situation sooner rather than later. An effective way to realize this goal
is to improve our country’s competitive edge against China and Japan in the US
market through a KORUS FTA.”8
In this sense, the KORUS FTA was an aggressive attempt by South Korea to sign
an FTA with the United States ahead of China and Japan. The Roh government’s
policy stance was once again ascertained by the remarks of Trade Minister Kim Hyun-
chong, who argued, “The KORUS FTA is the key to the survival of our nation that is
sandwiched between China and Japan. . . . With the successful launching of the
KORUS FTA, we will be able to emerge as an FTA hub in the region, as it will attract
other neighboring countries to FTA negotiations with us” (Joongang Daily, April 6,
2007). In a similar vein, Yoon Young-kwan, who served as the first minister of foreign
affairs and trade of the Roh administration, stressed that an FTA with the United States
is a useful means to promote South Korea’s role as an economic hub country in East
Asia. He argued that a KORUS FTA is compatible with South Korea’s globalization
strategy that began in the early 1990s under President Kim Young-sam. For Yoon, it
was important for South Korea to improve its competitive edge in high value-added
service industries.9
Second, the Roh government believed that the KORUS FTA had the potential to
improve not only economic ties but also overall diplomatic and security relations
between Seoul and Washington. In light of the volatile security outlook in Northeast
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7. Worries were expressed in Japan that a prospective US-South Korean accord could put
Japan at a competitive disadvantage in the US market. Such recognition might motivate
Japan to seek an FTA with the United States, and this could in turn affect China’s interest
in an FTA with the United States.
8. A presidential speech delivered to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, March
28, 2006. http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LOD&office_id=023&article_id=
0000178504.
9. A speech delivered to a conference organized by the Association of Junior High and High
School Teachers, Jeju Island, July 24, 2006.
Asia—China’s growth, Japan’s normalization, and most importantly North Korea’s
nuclear adventurism—the Roh government had few options but to strengthen its ties
with the United States. Cementing diplomatic ties with the United States is strategically
important because South Korea’s future lies in coordinating with the United States to
ensure the peaceful resolution of the current North Korean nuclear crisis.10 The
KORUS FTA was expected to have pacifying effects on the Korean peninsula as well
as in East Asia as a whole.
The Roh government thought that the KORUS FTA would significantly bolster
diplomatic and security relations between the two traditional allies. It was considered
necessary to remedy the deteriorating bilateral relationship. Since his inauguration,
President Roh has repeatedly argued that it was time for South Korea to turn the
bilateral relationship into a more equal one. The Roh government made clear that the
United States should not impede South Korea’s attempt at improving the inter-Korean
relationship under the guise of the sunshine policy, which strained the robustness of
the alliance. The KORUS FTA was seen as a way to restore the Korea-U.S. alliance.
Third, the Roh government attempted to incorporate North Korea into the regional
and global economy with the KORUS FTA. In negotiations, not just with the United
States but with all potential FTA partners, the Roh government tried to insert a special
provision about the rules of origin for products made by South Korean companies in
Gaeseong in North Korea; it succeeded in part in FTAs with Singapore, ASEAN, and
the EFTA. The Roh government expected that North Korea’s increased economic inte-
gration into the regional and global economy would ultimately lead to a soft landing
for the North’s economy, easing uncertainty on the Korean peninsula.
CONCLUSION: 
DIVERSE ECONOMIC-SECURITY LINKAGE STRATEGIES
While FTAs have mushroomed in East Asia since 2000, East Asian countries have
pursued FTAs not merely to increase their economic interests. In many cases, they
have attempted to link FTAs to broader security considerations. However, they have
demonstrated markedly diverse ways of accomplishing this, depending on their primary
economic and security imperatives as well as their domestic political situations. For
China and Japan, strategic rivalry for regional leadership in East Asian is a primary
factor, facilitating both countries to compete to sign FTAs with ASEAN. China was
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10. South Korea had to follow the path that China and Japan set as it signed an FTA with
ASEAN.
eager to assure neighboring countries, particularly Southeast Asian countries, of its
peaceful rise. From China’s standpoint, an FTA with ASEAN was an effective means
to allay their growing security concern as well as to stop them from aligning with the
United States.
China’s preemptive move accelerated Japan’s efforts to drastically change its strategy
from pursuing FTAs with individual countries to pursuing an FTA with ASEAN.
Japan also attempted to forge ties with extra-regional powers such as Australia to
counter the growing influence of China. However, afraid of political opposition from
domestically entrenched agricultural interests, the Japanese government could not
extend this linkage strategy to the United States.
Singapore also aggressively seeks FTAs with major powers, inside and outside the
region, and has signed FTAs with China, Japan, and the United States. Because its
immediate security concern is mainly with neighboring countries with different cultural
traditions, Singapore tries to attract as many great powers as possible into Southeast
Asia. The Singapore government believes that its growing economic interdependence
with great powers will reduce its security vulnerability as the great powers would
favor a stable regional order.
South Korea’s linkage strategy is unique in East Asia, given that it successfully
transformed a security alliance into a comprehensive alliance. With its ambitious
regional vision in trouble, the Roh government regarded FTAs as a more effective
mechanism for realizing its strategic goals. The KORUS FTA vividly demonstrates the
emergence of South Korea’s linkage strategy. The Lee Myung-Bak government further
strengthened this strategy, emphasizing the importance of economic and security ties
with the United States. Recognizing that tension in the Korean-US alliance had signifi-
cantly increased under the previous (Roh) government, the Lee government presented
the KORUS FTA to the National Assembly, despite vehement oppositions from civil
activist groups and opposition parties. Moreover, it would have been impossible for
South Korea to renegotiate the KORUS FTA from a purely economic point of view.
The examination of individual countries’ linkage strategies reveals interesting
points. First, strategic competition between China and Japan facilitated the emergence
of linkage strategies in East Asia. China’s and Japan’s security considerations have
prevented a China-Japan FTA, thereby blocking the formation of an East Asian FTA.
As a result, both countries have competed to attract Southeast Asian countries as their
FTA partners, which would greatly help them take regional leadership. China, with the
benefit of a highly centralized policy-making structure, has moved ahead of Japan in
this race. China’s attempt at an FTA with ASEAN was intended not just to assuage
Southeast Asian countries’ fear of the economic rise of China, but also to place Japan
on the defensive diplomatically.
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